This paper investigates the determinants of newspapers'provision for political endorsements. I empirically examine the role of newspapers'political preferences and market competition on newspapers'decision. Regression results suggest that market competition inhibits newspapers from making endorsements. Results from a simple model show that newspapers' ideology determine their endorsements, turning partisan papers more likely to make political recommendations and more likely to endorse challengers than non-partisan newspapers.
Introduction
The newspaper industry has an important societal role: it collects information and reports to readers. Understanding the determinants of these practices is a continuous concern for policy makers.
Assistant Professor. School of Economics, University of East Anglia E-mail: f-de.leon@uea.ac.uk Previous studies show that American newspapers are politically biased in their news reporting. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) …nd that sales motivation is an important determinant of the political slants on news reports. Kim (2008) …nds that newspaper owners'political contributions correlate with newspapers'choice of which candidate to endorse. A vast economic and political science literature is focused in understanding how information reported by media is shaped.
Despite that, the determinants of newspapers'provision of information have been overlooked in the literature. This paper takes a step towards …lling this gap, in investigating newspaper political endorsements. It aims to answer the question: How do newspapers decide whether to make an endorsement or to abstain in a political race? I investigate the empirical association between newspapers'likelihood of making endorsements and: (i) newspapers'political orientation and, (ii) market competition.
Political endorsements are useful because they circumvent measurement challenges in identifying newspapers' decision whether to provide information. Firstly, endorsements are an objective measure of newspaper political opinion, since they represent a clear stand, favoring a candidate.
Secondly, during elections, newspapers face an identical opportunity of taking a stand. Therefore, their choice set is observable (as opposed to news that is determined by a random occurrence of events and is unobservable to readers until reported). Measuring the correlation between competition and newspaper's reporting practice is also challenging. Newspapers face a di¤erent set of competitors in di¤erent geographical areas, while news itself is supposed to reach all newspaper readers. Political endorsements are tailored messages for a subset of readers: those who live in a particular political jurisdiction. This feature allows one to test whether the level of competition a newspaper faces in an electoral jurisdiction correlates with its behavior. By design, there is a "separation wall"between the editorial and news section. However, many studies show that editorial page opinions in…ltrate news pages (Puglisi and Snyder 2008 To identify this relationship, I collect a new dataset on demographics and newspaper industry structure at the county level. I propose a simple data transformation to identify these characteristics at the newspaper-jurisdiction level. I …rst construct a variable that is the fraction of the political jurisdiction in which a newspaper operates as a monopolist. Then, I test whether this variable correlates with the likelihood of an endorsement with probit regressions. The variation in the data allows me to make comparisons of endorsement behavior across areas where newspapers face a di¤erent degree of competition, holding constant politicians'behavior, readership and newspapers'intrinsic characteristics. Hence, I am able to circumvent some confounding e¤ects regarding the measurement of the impact of market structure on newspaper behavior, such as the selection of politicians that run for election in di¤erent jurisdictions or characteristics of newspapers that are established in markets with di¤erent market structures.
Understanding this association is important for policy reasons. With the decline of newspapers' circulation, public e¤orts, such as the Newspaper Preservation Act, have been undertaken. The goal is to preserve competition, aiding the survival of multiple daily newspapers in a given market (Busterna and Piccard 1993) . Despite this, there is little empirical evidence of whether (or how) newspapers'speech responds to competition. 1 In the second part of the paper, I address a di¤erent question: whether and to which extent newspapers' ideological preferences a¤ect endorsement behavior. I develop a simple model of newspaper endorsements. I consider an environment where newspapers are characterized by a political orientation -left-, neutral or right-wing-and only make well-informed endorsements. The model internalizes the characteristics of candidates running in a race on newspapers'decision whether to make an endorsement. The model is estimated using endorsement choices from ninety American newspapers over 154 races in the 2002 and 2006 American Elections. Previous studies have quanti…ed newspapers' 1 Lacy and Davenport (1994) and Entman (1985) empirically investigated this relationship. proposed framework is that it is able to determine whether and to which extended newspapers'political orientation a¤ect their likelihood of making endorsements.
The results are consistent with the view of newspapers as politically biased: they take their political preferences into consideration when choosing their endorsements and are more likely to be partisan than non-partisan. This in turn makes partisan papers at least 25% more likely to declare endorsements than non-partisan papers. Ideological heterogeneity across newspapers explains endorsements to challenger candidates. While non-partisan papers are at least eight times more likely to endorse incumbents rather than challengers, partisan papers are no more than three times more likely to endorse incumbents rather than challengers that share their political views.
Turning to the remaining results, market competition strongly correlates with newspapers' endorsement practice. Newspapers are more likely to make endorsements in jurisdictions they operate as monopolists than in areas they face more competition.
This …nding is new. It is observed in both raw correlations and regressions controlling for newspaper-and electoral race-…xed e¤ects. This paper proceeds in six sections. Section Two discusses why and how the likelihood of endorsements might be correlated with market competition. Section Three explains the data and the constructed measure of the degree of competition faced by newspapers at the jurisdiction level. Section Four presents the results of a probit model. Section Five describes a simple structural model of endorsement, and presents its results. Section Six concludes.
Endorsements and Market Competition
Political endorsement are located in the editorial or opinion-editorial (Op-Ed) section of the newspaper. The editorial section is the institutional opinion of the newspaper, representing its voice for endorsing candidates, taking a stance on issues, criticizing 4 o¢ cial decisions and commenting on events. The editorial board decides the newspaper's endorsements (Meltzer 2007) . It consists of the editorial page editor, the editorial cartoonist and other writers, and is many times o¢ cially subordinate to the publisher, who is the business executive of the paper. 2 He/she might make choices taking into consideration the level of competition faced in a market (Black 1982) . Overall, competition might in ‡uence newspapers'characteristics and politicians'behavior. These, intern, might a¤ect newspapers'endorsement practices. I will describe four main mechanisms. needs better in areas with higher newspaper coverage. 3 Market structure might be correlated with media exposure. For example, citizens that live in competitive markets might have characteristics -such as being more educated or politically informed-which makes them more prone to read newspapers. In this case, incumbent "quality" might respond to market structure, turning newspapers more likely to make endorsements.
Thirdly, despite (or in addition to) politicians' behavior and newspaper political views, pro…t-motivated newspapers might react to competition. How market forces directly a¤ect newspapers'willingness to make endorsements is ambiguous. On one hand, 2 This position is occupied by a career executive with vast knowledge of the newspaper market.
For example, the New York Times publisher-Arthur Sulzberger, Jr-joined The Times in 1978 as a correspondent and since then has worked in a variety of business departments, such as production and corporate planning. He also worked as assistant publisher and deputy publisher, overseeing the news and business departments, before becoming publisher of The New York Times in 1992. 3 They …nd that politicians who are less covered by the local press are less likely to stand witness before congressional hearings and to serve on constituency-oriented committees. Also, federal spending is lower in areas where there is less press coverage of the local members of Congress.
endorsements represent (possibly useful) information readers look for during elections. 
Market Competition Measure
The utilized measure of market competition is the proportion of the newspaper circulation in monopolistic areas within an electoral jurisdiction. 5 In constructing this variable, I …rst classi…ed counties as monopolistic or not monopolistic, following the methodology utilized in Borenstein and Rose (1994) . A county was classi…ed as having a monopolistic structure if a single newspaper has more than 90% of total circulation among newspapers circulating in the county. A county was classi…ed as not having a monopolistic structure if no single newspaper accounts for more than 90% of total circulation. To identify these classes, I used information about newspaper county circulation, 4 The sample of newspapers was selected from papers that report to the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC). Of this group, only newspapers that made at least one political endorsement during any election were selected (the ones identi…ed as having an endorsement practice). 5 Alternative measures of competition in the newspaper market are used in the literature. Table 1 shows the characteristics of counties in this sample (Column 3). 9 Column 1 and 2 compare counties with a monopolistic and a non-monopolistic market structure.
Monopolistic counties constitute 35.6% of the sample. They have a higher concentration of hispanics, blacks and they are more politically homogeneous than non-monopolistic counties. 6 For the 658 counties considered, I identi…ed all the operating newspapers and their participation at that level based on 2005 Audit Bureau circulation data. For the seven states in this study, the newspaper market is composed of two hundred and thirty-one newspapers. Larger newspapers are over-represented in this sample. The sample represents 20.4% of total newspapers in the seven states. 7 The composition of newspaper readership is not observable at the county level. In this study, I
assume that county population is representative of the readership at this level. 8 For example, if John Kerry received one hundred percent of the votes (or zero percent of the votes) in a county, this measure would be equal to 0.5. If he received half of the votes, this measure would be equal to zero. Within this index metric, heterogeneous counties must be closer to zero and more homogeneous counties must be closer to 0.5. 9 Among all considered counties, 14 do not report any newspaper circulation. For this reason, these are excluded from the analysis and I considered only 644 counties. 
Aggregation at the Newspaper-Political Jurisdiction Level
Endorsement choices are observed at the jurisdiction level. Since newspaper readership characteristics and market competition are only available at the county level, I
aggregated those at the political jurisdiction level. The races considered in this study are the ones for which the county is a subset of an electoral district.
The aggregation rule is a simple (weighted) average of county characteristics across counties in a jurisdiction. The weights are newspaper speci…c. They are the ratio between a newspaper's reader share at the county level 10 and its total reader share at the political jurisdiction level. 11 They were constructed in the following way: a newspaper j circulates in a jurisdiction d, composed of m counties indexed by u. Using the information about newspaper county circulation, I calculated the newspaper county reader share (RC ju );jurisdiction reader share (RD jd )and W eights jd as described below:
RC ju 10 Newspaper county reader share is the percentage of newspapers'readers that live in a county. 11 Newspaper district reader share is the percentage of newspapers'readers that live in a district.
Next, I constructed newspaper-jurisdiction characteristics (X jd ) as described below, using county characteristics (X u ) and W eights.
This aggregation was performed for all characteristics (readership and market struc- 
Probit Results
This section reports the results of probit regressions explaining newspapers'probability of making an endorsement. The empirical speci…cation is expressed by (1) .
The dependent variable is a dummy of value one if a newspaper j made an endorsement in race r in year t, and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient of interest is .
Other characteristics, possibly correlated with the newspapers'probability of making an endorsement, are controlled for. These are z jd ; representing newspaper readership (demographics and of political views). Electoral race characteristics are represented by v r . Newspaper-, electoral race-and year-…xed e¤ects are represented by j , r , t , and" jrt represents a stochastic error term. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of the 154 races. whether the race is statewide, a dummy indicating whether the incumbent is not running for re-election in the race. 4) **Signi…cant at the 5% level.
The results are described in Table 2 . Newspapers are more likely to make endorsements in jurisdictions they are more likely to operate as monopolists. This is observed in the raw data (Column 1) and in regressions controlling for readership and newspaper…xed e¤ects (Column 2) and electoral race-…xed e¤ects (Column 3.) The results are weaker for the speci…cation including all controls (Column 4). The coe¢ cient is only statistically signi…cant at 12% level. These estimated results suggest that newspapers prioritize to provide political endorsements in areas where they operate as monopolists.
This association is present regardless of candidates that self-select to run for Election in these markets, or newspapers'intrinsic characteristics (such as their ideological views) correlated with market structure.
This association can be observed for di¤erent reasons. Newspapers might prefer to provide their advice in monopolistic areas because their readers have less access to local politics and face a higher demand for newspaper opinion than other readers. A simple test for this is to examine whether this relationship holds across di¤erent electoral races.
In higher ballot races, such as Gubernatorial and US Senate, voters have more alternative sources of media information than local newspapers, such as television or national newspaper election coverage. If newspapers are more likely to make endorsements in monopolistic areas because these readers are more in need of information, then this association should be smaller in these higher ballot races than in lower ballot races. Table 3 presents the result for regressions, using jurisdiction …xed-e¤ects and reader share as controls. I conducted regressions separately to di¤erent type of races: (i)
Gubernatorial and US Senate presented in Column 1 (ii) US House and State senate presented in Column 2. The coe¢ cient is only signi…cant in Column 1.
Candidates running for election in higher ballot races are more well-known than those running for lower ballot races. In these races, readers can more easily judge newspapers based on these endorsements, and compare endorsements across newspapers in competitive areas. Reputational concerns and the e¤ects newspapers believe endorsements might have on their future readership might play a role in newspapers'decisions.
Consistent with the idea that this motive is explaining the observed association, a relationship between market competition and likelihood of endorsement is not observed for the US House and State senate races. In these races, readers rely more on local newspaper endorsements to decide their votes (Leon 2009.) In the next section, I present an investigation about the impact of newspapers'ideo-logical preferences on the likelihood of endorsements. The kinds of candidates that are running for election might in ‡uence newspaper choice whether to make an endorsement in a race. Partisan papers might derive more grati…cation from supporting candidates than non-partisan papers, making them more likely to make political recommendations than other papers. 12 In order to test this, I propose and estimate a simple structural model. It takes into consideration the interdependence among endorsement choices (of whether and whom to endorse) and quanti…es newspapers'political preferences. is not yet fully informed about other characteristics such as honesty, competence and political record. These are important determinants of its assessment of candidates and consequently of its endorsements. To …nd out about these, the newspaper has to investigate candidates'records and conduct interviews. 
A Simple Model of Endorsements
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The newspaper faces the following problems: it has to decide in which of the races it will provide its endorsement to readers. Since newspapers only make well-informed endorsements and the research process is costly, the newspaper has to decide whether to endorse or not in a race. For any given election, it makes the decision of whether to make an endorse in a race by comparing the expected value of its (future) endorsement with its cost of it. Once the research is done, the newspaper, fully informed, declares its endorsement.
14 I next summarize and introduce the notation. A newspaper j has one of three possible political ideological positions (H 2 fh 1; h 2; h 3 g), which are left-wing (h 1 ), neutral (h 2 ), and right-wing (h 3 ). In general elections, it faces several races e;where two candidates c, c 2 fD; Rg are running for election. For any of these, it potentially makes two sequential decisions. First, it makes a decision t 2 f0; 1g to endorse in a race (t= 1) or not (t= 0). In making this decision, it compares the cost of investigating an election (and making an endorsement) with the expected value of its announcement.
Second, conditional on endorsing in a race, it can make three types of announcements i 2 fD; R; ?g;"endorse the Democrat" (i = D), "endorse the Republican" (i = R), or explicitly declare "no endorsement for either of the candidates" (i = ?). This last announcement represents newspaper abstention in a political race once it determines that neither of the candidates meets its standards to receive an endorsement. 15 I will next detail the payo¤s and decision problem for both decisions, starting with the second. After these components are described, choice probabilities and estimation procedure are speci…ed.
14 Newspapers report they always investigate candidates before making endorsements (Post Crescent 2006). 15 This assumption is based on evidence from the data. When newspapers declare "no endorsement for either candidate," they justify this choice as due to the low quali…cations of the candidates. 
Decision of Which Candidate to Endorse
In the second decision, conditional on having incurred costs in the research process, the newspaper can make two types of announcements. The …rst type favors a candidate.
The payo¤ derived from this type of announcement is the newspaper's satisfaction from endorsing its preferred candidate and it is determined by newspaper evaluation of the candidate. It has three components: (i) a deterministic component related to newspaper political preference; (ii) a deterministic component unrelated to newspaper political preference; and (iii) the newspaper's overall evaluation of the candidates'unobservable characteristics -such as quality, honesty, and historical record -revealed through research (" 
Decision to Endorse in a Race
In the …rst decision, the newspaper faces the choice of whether or not research the candidates to …nd out their (ex-ante) unobservable characteristics, and to make an endorsement in a race. The payo¤ to the newspaper's endorsement in a race has two components: its expected bene…t and the cost of endorsement. The payo¤ of the endorsement alternative, denoted by EN D, is described below:
The …rst element, E(Z D j ; Z R j ) denotes the expected bene…t of a (future) endorsement. This is the foreseen value of an endorsement and is a function of the characteristics of candidates running in a political race combined with newspaper political orientation, as described in section 4.1.
The endorsement cost, COST conveys both research and reputation costs in making endorsements. I assumed a simple functional form for this, as described below:
It is determined by a …xed endorsement cost common to all newspapers ( 0 ). I then let the cost vary by newspaper size, reader share in a jurisdiction and election characteristics (RCE j ). These characteristics might a¤ect the research cost as they convey, respectively, di¤erent levels of paper resources and employees, previous political knowledge of the place and politicians' visibility. I allow the cost to vary by readership demographics and political leanings in a district (RCD j ) as these might explain specialization in a market or di¤erent perceived costs in making endorsements.
Lastly, the cost might vary by the market structure faced in the district (RCM j ).
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These parameters partially identify the correlation between newspapers' likelihood of making endorsements and market competition. The cost variables are compressed in RC j , where RC j = (RCE j ; RCD j ; RCM j ). These are detailed in the Appendix. The cost of endorsement is also determined by a research cost shock RES j , assumed to be drawn from a type I extreme value distribution with mean zero and scale parameter = 1.
20
The payo¤ to non-endorsing, denoted by N EN D; has two components: a deterministic component normalized to zero and a taste shock N RES j associated with this alternative. 21 This is assumed to be drawn from a type I extreme value distribution with mean zero and scale parameter = 1.
A newspaper's …rst decision is whether to make an endorsement (t(H) = 1) or abstain form endorsing (t(H) = 0) in the race, solving the following problem:
M ax t(H)2f0;1g t(H)[EN D N EN D]
19 Note that another way to incorporate market competition in the analysis would be to properly model the interaction of newspapers on their endorsement decisions. However, taking this road would inevitably require some assumption about how readers evaluate newspapers based on their announced endorsements (and therefore how newspapers react to that with their endorsement decisions in competitive markets as opposed to monopolistic markets.) Mostly for this lack of prior about what readers consider to be a good endorsement, I will abstain from including this explanation in the model and treat competition in a reduced form way. 20 This component is unobservable to the researcher and re ‡ects, for example, a shortage of interns to collect information about the politicians, or politicians directly contacting newspapers to facilitate an interview. 21 This stochastic term is supposed to explain any remaining di¤erence in the endorsement decisions of di¤erent newspapers when the research costs they face are the same. This could be related to the editor's mood, for example.
Choice Probabilities and Estimation Procedure
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. For the construction of the likelihood function, one needs to derive the choice probabilities. I will …rst specify the probability of a decision to make an endorsement and the conditional probabilities of an endorsement after the newspaper has decided to invest in the research process. Next, I specify the likelihood function, and the estimation procedure.
Choice Probability of Endorsement in a Race. In the …rst decision, the probabilities of endorsement (t(H) = 1) and no endorsement (t(H) = 0) are derived based on integration over j and described:
Choice Probability of Endorsement to a Candidate: Conditional on deciding to make an endorsement and investing in research, the newspaper learns " i j , and decides which announcement to make. Integrating the shocks, the probabilities of endorsing a Democrat, a Republican, or declaring "no endorsement for either candidate" are respectively:
The likelihood of an endorsement observation for a given race e and a given newspaper political orientation type is denoted by L je :
Likelihood of the Entire Newspaper Endorsement Pro…le
Multiple endorsement choices are observed for each newspaper. By combining the sequence of endorsement choices and summing over the possible types of political orientation, the contribution of a newspaper j is Y j :
The log-likelihood function is then equal to the sum of the log of the individual contributions Y j , over all newspapers in the sample: K = P j ln Y j . The parameters to be estimated are: i) editorial boards' valuation of politicians' characteristics; ii) newspapers'costs of making endorsements and iii) a probability distribution for newspapers'political orientation. The estimated parameters are the ones that maximize the log-likelihood.
Results
The estimates for the parameters related to the newspaper's decision of whether to make endorsements are described in Table 4 . These are the determinants for newspapers'endorsement costs. The parameters are measured in a utility metric, so I will focus the interpretation on their sign. Newspapers face lower (higher) costs in jurisdictions where they are more (less) likely to make endorsements. The results point to a positive cost of making endorsements as revealed by the sign of 0 (7.533). Papers face di¤erent costs according to election, readership and newspaper characteristics. The cost is lower as the share of a newspaper's readers that live in the political jurisdiction increases. This is consistent with the expectation that newspapers hold more political knowledge and face lower research costs in these elections. Larger newspapers (those among the 100 largest newspapers in the US) face lower costs, and therefore are more likely to make endorsements, than other newspapers.
The cost depends on readership race and degree of political homogeneity. Newspapers are more likely to make endorsements in jurisdictions where there is a higher concentration of whites, blacks, Hispanics and where their readership is more politically homogeneous. Consistent with the probit regression …ndings, newspapers face lower costs for making endorsements in jurisdictions they are more likely to operate as monopolists.
The estimates for the parameters related to candidates'choice are described in Ta-21 ble 5. They show that incumbency and ideology are determinants for endorsements.
Both candidate ideological alignment with newspaper readership and candidate ideological alignment with the newspaper explain the endorsement. However, the estimated parameters indicate that newspapers value more their own ideological preferences than those of their readers when deciding whom to endorse.
The coe¢ cients R and D point to an asymmetry between left-wing and rightwing papers on their valuation of candidates. It is larger for left-wing than for rightwing newspapers, suggesting that left-wing newspapers are more partisan than rightwing newspapers on their decision of whom to endorse. This di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at 5% level.
The model also predicts newspapers are more likely to be partisan (have a leftwing or a right-wing orientation) than non-partisan (have a neutral orientation), as described in Table 6 . These results are consistent with the general view of newspapers as politically biased (Pew, 2005.) Table 7 presents estimated probabilities of endorsements, when newspapers'political ideology is exogenously changed. In the model, I assumed that partisan newspapers have an extra incentive to make endorsements in comparison to non-partisan papers: insofar that they are supporting candidates with similar political views. 22 A direct implication is that this makes partisan newspapers more likely to incur costs for making endorsements than non-partisan papers. According to the results, partisan papers are at least 25% more likely to make endorsements than non-partisan papers (row 1). Consistent with the estimated parameters, left-wing (right-wing) papers are more likely to endorse Democrats (Republicans) than neutral or right-wing (left-wing) papers. The implication of these last facts is that most newspaper political endorsements are "politically biased" in the sense they are partially determined by newspapers'political preferences.
Rows (5)- (10) Table 7 , all types of newspapers are more likely to endorse incumbents than challengers. However, while non-partisan papers endorse incumbents at least eight times more often than challengers, partisan papers endorse incumbents no more than three times more often than they endorse challengers who share their political views. 22 Data shows that this is a reasonable assumption. The model assumes newspapers make two sequential choices. However, one can also imagine that newspapers make endorsements without a research process, using only the information they have on hand. In this case, the newspaper endorsement decision could be modeled by a multinomial logit. I compared this model's predictions with those of a multinomial logit with the same number of control variables. The model achieves a higher log-likelihood value (-813.80) than the multinomial logit (-855.18), and predicts newspapers' actual choices with higher success than a multinomial logit does in 57.4% of the cases. This evidence suggests that the adopted model'assumptions re ‡ect the data better than the ones behind the simple model. 
